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ABSTRACT

The appeasement policy

culminated with the Munich

Agreement in September 1938 and its effects are still being
felt today.

Because of his preconceived notions and

inflexible world view, British Prime Minister Chamberlain
did not listen to the pleas of those who opposed
appeasement.

He ignored their opinions about military

build-up, possible German war aims, or anything else that
challenged the viability of his appeasement policy.
Ultimately, Chamberlain's tunnel vision caused the
destruction of the democratic country of Czechoslovakia and
promoted the most destructive war in human history.

The

purpose of this thesis is to analyze Chamberlain's
justifications, the strategies of his opponents (focusing
on the British and Czechoslovak opposition), British public
opinion, demonstrate the Czechoslovak government's position
from 1938 to 1942 and analyze its struggle to reverse the
repercussions of an agreement they considered a Diktat.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Second World War, the term
"Munich" has been consistently used as an excuse for
maintaining nonnegotiable diplomatic positions, such as
opposing the seating of People's Republic of China in the
United Nations, and maintaining the United States' military
stance in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

In July 1955, Vice

President Richard Nixon was so concerned that President
Dwight Eisenhower, on his return from the Geneva Summit
where he had met with British, French, and Soviet leaders,
would be associated with Chamberlain and his ever-present
umbrella, that he forbade the use of umbrellas at the
airport presidential speech.1 Although probably an
overreaction, Nixon feared repercussions if the public
associated Eisenhower with Chamberlain and his notorious
appeasement policy.

Although not as influential today,

"myth of Munich" still plays an important role in the world

'Keith Eubank., Munich. (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1963): 298. Eisenhower met with the British, French,
and Soviet leaders in Geneva to discuss post-war policies
including Western occupation of Berlin. Eisenhower staunchly
rejected the Soviet ultimatum that the West withdraw their
troops from Berlin.
1

2

of foreign policy.

The term appeasement is unpalatable,

and political association with it could mean disaster for
prospective politicians.
The "myth of Munich" is also of interest to historians
who battle over the origins and effects of the Diktat.
Some contend that Chamberlain had no choice but to sign the
Munich Agreement because the British military remained
weak.

They believe that Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler did

not just trick British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain
into agreeing with him but left Chamberlain with no other
viable options.2

Other historians argue that

Chamberlain's reasons were justified and the Munich
Agreement was ultimately a success because it allowed Great
Britain another year to prepare for war.

If war had

started in 1938 instead of 1939, they believe, Germany
probably would have won the Battle of Britain.

They argue

that the Czechoslovak military was weak and the Soviet
Union would not have honored its treaty to come to the aid
of Czechoslovakia if the Germans attacked, leaving Britain
and France to face the German war machine alone.3

Some

historians have even insisted that Czechoslovakia should be
thankful for Chamberlain's policy of appeasement.

They

compare the 100,000 Czechoslovak casualties during the war

2John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: Prologue to Tragedy
(New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948).
3Eubank, Munich.
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to the 6,500,000 Polish casualties,

claiming that this

discrepancy is the result of Polish unwillingness to
surrender to Germany without a fight.4 Other historians
contend that the appeasement policy was not flawed but
Chamberlain's mistakes were getting involved with the
German-Czechoslovak problem and trying to negotiate with
Hitler from a weakened position.

For these historians, the

lesson of Munich is one all democratic countries should
study before getting involved with dictators.5
The problem with these arguments is the misplacement
of responsibility.

Although some of Chamberlain's

reasoning at the Munich Conference might be understandable,
the blame must be laid on his entire policy of appeasement.
The appeasement of Germany was a erroneous policy adopted
by Chamberlain, culminating with the Munich Agreement, and
contributing to the loss of forty million lives in the
Second World War.
Chamberlain had several honorable if narrow and
mistaken reasons for pursuing appeasement which led to the
Munich Conference and the eventual German occupation of the
Czech Lands.

In the late 1930s, not only the British

4A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War
(New York: MacMillian Publishing Company, 1961), XXVII.
These figures do not include the 260,000 Czechoslovak Jews or
the 2,800,000 Polish Jews murdered by the Nazis.
Paul R.
Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinhart, eds. The Jew in the Modern
World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 520.
5Laurence Thompson, The Greatest Treason: The Untold
Story of Munich (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1968).
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government but other governments around the world
considered appeasement a viable option for dealing with
Hitler.

Chamberlain's and his supporters' reasons for

adopting the appeasement policy were diverse.

They assumed

that Hitler was a "normal" leader of state who could be
dealt with in traditional diplomatic terms.

They believed

Europe could not endure another bloodletting like that of
the First World War.

There were many British politicians

who correctly feared that another world war would surely
cause the destruction of the already declining British
Empire.6 Flaws in the Treaty of Versailles, signed after
the First World War, were used to justify yielding to
German demands, the rationale being to correct the apparent
injustices imposed on Germany by the victors after the war.
Although the appeasement policy was publicly and
politically sanctioned in Britain until its obvious failure
on 15 March 1939, a large minority of people consistently
opposed pacifying Hitler at any cost throughout the late
1930s.

They too had valid reasons for their political

views; primarily they wanted to continue Britain's policy
of maintaining the balance of power on the continent.
Germany, they feared, was significantly altering this
balance and they believed that for the sake of world peace,
Germany should be contained.

6Hermann Rauschning, "Is Chamberlain Right?"
(3 February 1939) , 167.

Spectator

Because of his preconceived notions and inflexible
world view, Chamberlain did not listen to the pleas of
those who opposed appeasement.

He ignored their opinions

about military build-up, possible German war aims, or
anything else that challenged the viability of his
appeasement policy.

Ultimately, Chamberlain's tunnel

vision caused the destruction of Czechoslovakia and
promoted the most destructive war in human history.
Had the Prime Minister not pressured Czechoslovakia
into surrendering the Sudeten Lands to Germany, the Third
Reich would not have gained control of vital Czechoslovak
resources and industries and been able to begin and
prosecute the war as long as it did.

The Czechoslovak

military was well respected throughout Europe, and coupled
with the natural barrier mountains in the Sudeten Lands
created, it would have posed a considerable threat to the
German war machine and possibly hastened the end of the war
or prevented its expansion on a worldwide scale.

Certainly

Hitler appreciated the importance of the Czechoslovak
resources in his quest for Lebensraum [living space] and
had no concern for continental balance of power.

On 15

March 1939, the Wehrmacht occupied rump Czechoslovakia. The
German occupiers terrorized the Czechoslovak people, forced
the division of the country and the formation of the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the puppet state of
Slovakia, stripped the territory of its vital industries

6

and resources, and used the newly acquired strategic
position to gain access to Ukrainian oil and to attack
Poland.

The opponents of appeasement were correct in their

analysis of Hitler and his real intentions, but their pleas
to prepare Britain militarily for another war and to
recognize the military and strategic importance of
Czechoslovakia, made no impression on Chamberlain.
and 1939, Hitler had free rein in Eastern Europe.

In 1938

CHAPTER 2
ORIGINS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Democracy of the West today is the forerunner
of Marxism, which would be inconceivable
without it. It is democracy alone which
furnishes this universal plague with the soil
in which it spreads.
In parliamentarianism,
its outward form of expression, democracy
created a monstrosity of filth and fire.
--Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf
The modern Czechoslovak state dates from the Paris
Peace Conference following the First World War. At this
meeting the victorious Entente powers established new
countries in East Central Europe in the name of selfdetermination of peoples as delineated in Woodrow Wilson's
Fourteen Points.7 One of these nascent countries was
Czechoslovakia, which was carved out of the former AustriaHungary.8 Czechoslovakia's borders were based not only on
7In the tenth point of his Fourteen Points, Woodrow
Wilson argued that the peoples of Austria-Hungary should be
accorded autonomy.
E.H. Carr, International Relations
Between the Two World Wars (1919-1939) (New York: St Martin's
Press, 1963), 283.
80n the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, see Z. A. B.
Zeman, The Break-Up of the Habsburg Empire, 1914-1918.
(London: Oxford University Press, 1961) and, Mark Cornwall,
e d . The Last Years of Austria-Hungary: Essays in Political
and Military History 1908-1918. (Exeter: University of Exeter
Press, 1990).
On the creation of Czechoslovakia, see:
Dagmar Perman, The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State:
Diplomatic History of the Boundaries of Czechoslovakia, 19141920. Studies on East European History, Vol. 7. (Leiden: C.
7

8

ethnic claims, but also on historic, strategic, and
geographic considerations.

Next to Yugoslavia, it was the

most heterogeneous of the successor states.

The other

countries in the region moved toward some form of
dictatorship during the interwar period, and by 1936
Czechoslovakia remained the only country in Central Europe
in which real parliamentary government, based on the
ballot, universal suffrage, and free elections, still
survived.9
The key element in interwar Czechoslovak foreign
policy was collective security.

Czechoslovakia's leaders

tried not to align themselves with any one major power but
rather sought a unified defense against any foreign threat.
Edvard Benes, the Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1918 to
1935 and six times chairman of the Council of the League of
Nations and once President to the Assembly, was the
architect of interwar Czechoslovak foreign policy.10 He
later served as President of Czechoslovakia from 1935 to

J. Brill, 1962).
9R.W. Seton-Watson, "Czechoslovakia in its European
Setting," Slavonic and East European Review (1936-1937): 113.
l0Edward Taborsky, President Edvard Benes : Between East
and West 1938-1948 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press,
1981), 85. See also Edvard Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes:
From Munich to New War and New Victory (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1954) .
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1938 and 1945 to 1948.11 During the interwar period,
Czechoslovakia supported the League of Nations,
disarmament, collective security, the Little Entente
(comprising Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania), and
mutual assistance treaties with France and the Soviet
Union.12 The treaty with France, signed in October 1925,
bound France to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia if it
were attacked.

Czechoslovak leaders also negotiated a

defensive alliance with the Soviet Union in May 1935.13
During the interwar years, Benes' solid reputation
improved his country's international profile.

He was

respected as a shrewd politician and well known in
political circles as a just man.

He made numerous trips

abroad between 1920 and 1928 and was described by most
politicians as a master

tactician with a quick mind and an

uncanny ability to anticipate opportunities.14 Benes'
circle of acquaintances

was wide.

author and acquaintance

of Benes,

The world renowned
H.G. Wells, described him

uFor discussion of his presidency, see for example, John
0. Crane and Sylvia Crane, Czechoslovakia: Anvil of the Cold
War (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 85.
12Ibid, 118.
13 Robert 0. Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1975), 423.
I4Piotr S. Wandycz, "Foreign Policy of Edvard Benes,
1918-1938," in Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luza, eds. A
History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918-1948 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1964), 217.
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as a great and world statesman.15 Throughout most of the
interwar period, however, Western public opinion remained
relatively ignorant of him and the country he represented.
However, by the late 1930s, this had changed.

In 1938,

Ernst Eisenlohr, the German Ambassador to Czechoslovakia,
noted:
Czechoslovakia, whose name was formerly
almost unknown in Great Britain, where hardly
anybody was inclined to bother about Prague's
difficulties, today commands a solid block of
supporters in the newspaper world, the
Liberal and Socialist Parties and their
Members of Parliament, as well as in
financial circles of the City of London.U)
Although it was not a major power, some Western
political leaders considered Czechoslovakia "the keystone
of the post-war arch [in Europe],"17 because of its
strategic geographic position between the East and the
West.

Czechoslovak armament production, for instance, was

bigger than that of Italy.

Czechoslovakia was the most

industrialized of the East Central European countries;

its

heavy industrial capacity surpassed that of all of the
other East-Central European countries combined.

It also

15"H . G. Wells' Views About Democracy", 4/172, Noel-Baker
Collection, Churchill Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge
University, Cambridge, England, 5,6 (Hereafter NBKR).
16Ernst Eisenlohr to the German Foreign Ministry, 12
January 1938, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945,
Series D., Vol. II.
Washington:
United States Government
Printing Office, 1949-1958, 98 (Hereafter DGFP).
17Seton-Watson, "Czechoslovakia in its European Setting,"
110.
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had very important chemical industries and an excellent-albeit untested— military.18 The Czechoslovak army, when
fully mobilized, consisted of 1.5 million men; the air
force had approximately 1,500 planes; and the
Czechoslovak's military leaders estimated it would take
three million German troops to overcome them.19 Not only
was Czechoslovakia industrially and militarily important,
it was also strategically significant as the gateway to
Ukrainian oil, the Danubian basin, and the Balkans.

During

the interwar era Britain almost completely overlooked
Czechoslovakia's industrial and military importance.
During the late 1930s, Chamberlain and the Western leaders
may have intentionally ignored this importance because of
their efforts to avoid war.

18Hubert Ripka, "Czechoslovakia--The Key to the Danubian
Basin," Slavonic and East European Review (10 June 1938): 5962 .
^Correspondent in South East Europe, "Hitler's
Objective?" Spectator. (2 September 1938): 361.

Real
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CHAPTER 3
DIPLOMACY OF APPEASEMENT

Though not the mastermind of appeasement, Chamberlain
is probably its best-known proponent.

Chamberlain chose

the diplomacy of appeasement as strategy for avoiding a
second world war.

As part of a generation of French,

British, and German leaders who had experienced the horrors
of war either as soldiers or civilians--the so-called "lost
generation"--he embraced appeasement as the logical policy
for avoiding another international confrontation.

These

men were products of an era that, while tired of war, was
regularly reminded of it by mangled war veterans, war
memorials, and ruins of buildings.

Some members of

Chamberlain's generation feared a repetition of the
communist revolutions which took place during and after the
First World War.

They feared that if another war occurred,

all of Europe might fall to Bolshevism.

They also believed

that since Hitler was violently anti-bolshevik, Germany
would serve as a barrier that helped contain communism in
Russia.

Stanley Baldwin, Chamberlain's predecessor, had

declared,

"If Hitler moves east, it shall not break my

heart."20

In the 1930s, Britain, more than any other

country in Europe, had renounced the political extreme of

20Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century. 418.
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communism.21
For Chamberlain appeasement seemed the only logical
course for Great Britain to take.

He studied problems and

issues thoroughly and made decisions following careful
analysis.

Once he made a decision he took a very single

minded approach to solving any problem.

Lord Edward

Halifax, Chamberlain's foreign secretary from 1938 to 1940
and an advocate of appeasement, remarked:
Anyone who worked with him
and I suppose I
worked as closely with him
as anybody, was
bound to be impressed by two things.
One was
his complete disinterestedness and disregard
of any lesser thoughts of self, and the other
his unfaltering courage and tenacity, once he
had made up his mind that a thing was
right.22
Chamberlain's appeasement policy embodied this resolve and
this tightly focused commitment kept him from listening to
any dissenting voices. That he could always get a majority
in Parliament made him even more intractable.

Various

Members of Parliament (MPs) were also appeasers and they
staunchly defended Chamberlain's policy, some even after
the German invasion of Poland. On 9 October 1939,Howard
Williams, an MP and an appeaser,

wrote to MP Phillip Noel

Baker, a staunch anti-appeaser, that the "pursuit of war to

21Benny Morris, The Roots of Appeasement:
The British
Weekly Press and Nazi Germany During the 1930s (London:
Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 1991), 2.
22Larry William
Fuchser,
Neville
Chamberlain
and
Appeasement: A Study in the Politics of History. (New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, 1982), 32.
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the bitter end...cannot possibly lead to any improvement in
the condition of the world."

He continued,

"What is

required is a new attitude towards world settlement, based
on willing renunciation of privilege and power."23
Chamberlain believed Nazism was a disease that
resulted from the Versailles Treaty and could best be cured
by systematically removing the sources of Hitler's
frustrations.

France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United

States formulated the Treaty of Versailles, and the Germans
were excluded from the negotiations and allowed to reply
only in writing.

The treaty dealt ruthlessly with Germany

not only in its financial demands but also in placing all
the blame for the war on the shoulders of the German
people.

Article 231 of the treaty, known as the “War-guilt

clause," declared that:
responsibility of Germany and her allies for
causing all the loss and damage to which the
Allied and Associated Governments and their
nationals have been subjected as a consequence of
the war imposed upon them by the aggression of
Germany and her allies.24
Almost before the Treaty of Versailles was signed,
German leaders representing most shades of the political
spectrum labeled it an unjust Diktat and began calling for
its revision.

Political voices from outside Germany,

including some influential British politicians, soon
23Howard Williams to Philip Noel-Baker, 4/47, 9 October
1939, NBKR.
24Eubank,

The Origins of World War II: 6.
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supported these calls.

In fact, by the end of the 1920s,

most educated Britons were convinced that all of the great
powers were responsible for the First World War.25
Although there was no fofmal revision

of the treaty, the

Western powers spent much of the 1930s trying to
accommodate Germany in part because of the "unjustness" of
the war guilt clause.

Many historians claimed "that both

Britain and Germany shared responsibility for the outbreak
of the war...the Treaty of Versailles was unjust and should
be revised."26
Hitler condemned the Treaty of Versailles as the
source for many of Germany's problems, such as the
worldwide depression which hit Germany earlier and harder
than any other European country but which also ended
relatively quickly there.

The depression was not a direct

result of the treaty, but merely an unfortunate event that
Hitler used to his political advantage.

Hitler's seizure

of power came at an ideal time for him, because he took
control when Germany was beginning to recover from the
depression.

He portrayed the Treaty of Versailles as a

Diktat that forced Germany to take responsibility for
starting the First World War when in reality, the Germans
believed that no such responsibility existed.

When Hitler

failed to comply with obligations placed on Germany by the
25Morris, Roots of Appeasement. 4.
26Eubank, The Origins of World War II, 3-13.
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treaty, Western powers and the appeasers excused Hitler's
actions as simply righting the wrongs of the Versailles
Treaty.
In 1938, Ernst Eisenlohr, the German Ambassador in
Prague, informed the German Foreign Ministry that the
British government followed a "policy of eliminating points
of friction in Europe in such a way as to avoid raising the
major problems which lie behind them."27 Chamberlain
believed strongly that his strategy of appeasement was the
"only one which is likely to lead us to our goal."28 He
had, of course, plausible, if inaccurate, reasons for
adopting this policy.

One of the most important was the

depression which had hit Europe in 1929.

Britain

experienced severe social and economic dislocation and
Chamberlain believed that domestic issues should take
precedence over foreign ones.

Foreign policy kept the

Prime Minister from concentrating solely on domestic
issues.

He clung to the hope that by succeeding in foreign

policy he would be able to accomplish his domestic goals of
revitalizing the British economy.
Once Chamberlain had adopted a strategy for
appeasement, he began a strategy to eliminate all
opposition to his foreign policy.

With his policy in place

27Eisenlohr to the German Foreign Ministry,
1938, DGFP 1918-1945. Series D., Vol. II, 98.

12 January

28Neville Chamberlain. In Search of Peace (Freeport, NY:
Books for Libraries Press, 1939), 91.
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and with a secure hold over the government, Chamberlain
wrote confidently in October 1937, "I am quite sure we
shall never again send to the continent an Army on the
scale of that which we put into the field in the Great
War."29 By 1938 he had proved his confidence by gaining
control of the British rearmament program and
systematically silencing those who opposed him. Two of
these critics were Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and Head
of the Admiralty Duff Cooper, both of whom resigned under
pressure.

On 25 February 1938, Winston Churchill, an

ardent foe of appeasement, wrote regretfully of Eden's
departure:
The resignation of Mr. Eden may well be a
milestone in history... That there was a
complete divergence between Mr. Eden and the
Prime Minister was plainly apparent.
Mr.
Eden adhered to the old policy which we
[Great Britain] have followed so long [rule
of law in Europe], and the Prime Minister and
his colleagues have entered upon another new
path.30
After Eden and Cooper departed, Chamberlain never brought
anyone into the cabinet who held views on foreign policy
which differed from his own.31
One of the biggest foreign policy dilemmas Chamberlain
faced was the increasing tension between Berlin and Prague
29Ibid, 85.
30"Good Week for Dictators,"
February 1938): 151.
York:

Manchester Guardian, (25

3lWilliam Rock, British Appeasement in the 1930s
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1977), 60.

(New
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over the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia.

Britain was

forced to handle the Sudeten German problem because of the
French-Czechoslovak treaty that guaranteed French aid if
Czechoslovakia were attacked.

If France went to war with

Germany, then many assumed Britain would follow.

By the

time Chamberlain had to make major decisions concerning the
Sudeten Germans, he was fully committed to his appeasement
policy.

Germany withdrew from the League of Nations in

1933, remilitarized the Rhineland in March 1936, and
effected Anschluss [unification] with Austria in March of
1938 without a hint of disapproval from the British.

In

fact, Britain condoned the last two as German selfdetermination and necessary to maintain world peace.
Chamberlain remained committed to doing anything necessary
to appease Hitler and thereby prevent another world war.
The Sudeten German problem concerned the more than
three million Germans who lived primarily in highly
industrialized border regions of the Czech Lands.

The

worldwide depression of 1929 hit the Sudeten Lands
particularly hard because of the region's dependence on
luxury and export goods.

After 1933, Germany's new

economic emphasis on autarky intensified problems for the
Sudeten regions by reducing exports to Czechoslovakia.32
The tendency of the Prague government to invest primarily

32R.
W.
Seton-Watson,
"The
German
Czechoslovakia" Foreign Affairs (1938): 660.

Minority

in
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in the Czech-populated interior of the country further
complicated the situation, as Seton-Watson, an observer
noted,
Rampant unemployment bred political
discontent and despair, and the Prague
Government was faced by a most difficult
situation in which its efforts to relieve
distress in any district brought reproaches
of discrimination from the others.
The Sudeten Germans, like the Reich Germans, blamed their
economic distress on external factors--the Sudeten's blamed
the Czechs and both groups of Germans blamed the Versailles
Peace Settlement.

The initiation of a common thread of

discontent began to tie the Nazis and the Sudeten Germans
together, and Hitler was quick to grasp the opportunity.
Hitler was all too aware of the importance of
Czechoslovakia.

From May 1935, Berlin began to take an

active interest in the affairs of the Sudeten Germans.34
Hitler used ethnic determination to make claims against
Czechoslovakia on behalf of the Sudeten Germans. When the
Fiihrer began calling for all ethnic Germans outside the
Reich to come Heim ins Reich [home to the Reich], he
specifically focused on the Sudeten Germans because of
Czechoslovakia's strategic importance to Germany.

No fewer

than twelve states in Europe had German minorities, but
Hitler targeted only those groups that were useful to him.
33Ibid, 661.
34David Stephens,
"Czechoslovakia's
Nineteenth Century (June 1938): 689.
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The Sudeten Germans were especially susceptible to Hitler's
nationalist rhetoric both because of their difficult
economic situation and their discontent with their minority
position in Czechoslovakia.
The Sudetendeutsche Partei (SdP) (Sudeten German
Party) of Czechoslovakia was not originally tied to the
National Socialists in Germany, but by the late 1930s
Hitler had enlisted most of the SdP leadership in the Nazi
crusade.

The SdP became increasingly totalitarian,

rejecting all other Sudeten German political parties, and
in foreign policy followed Germany in opposing the League
of Nations, the Little Entente, and the Czechoslovak pacts
with France and Russia.33 Konrad Henlein, the founder of
the SdP, "openly welcomed the achievement of 'Greater
Germany' and summoned all his co-nationals in the Republic
to join a single people's front."36
350n the development of the SdP see: Ronald M. Smelser
The Sudeten Problem 1933-1938:
Volkstumspolitik and the
Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan
University Press, 1975).
Some Sudeten Germans did oppose
Hitler particularly members of the German Social Democratic
Party.
For their role in the events of Munich as well as
wartime relations with Benes, see also Wenzel Jaksch, Europas
Wecr nach Potsdam (Stuttgart:
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt,
1958) .
36Seton-Watson, "The German Minority in Czechoslovakia,"
664. The Sudeten German Party, formerly the Sudeten German
Home Front changed its name to accommodate the Czechoslovak
government who claimed that 'front' was not democratic and
would not allow participation in elections under that name.
The name change came in April 1935 coupled with Henlein's
appointment as chairman to the party. In the May 1935
elections the SdP surpassed the votes obtained by the leading
government party with 1,249,530, but under the system of
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Totalitarianism in the Sudeten German districts did
not coincide well with the democracy practiced in
Czechoslovakia.

According to R. W. Seton-Watson, the

foremost British expert on Czechoslovakia during the
interwar era, for that country to "renounce foreign
alliances [as the SdP demanded it] would be nothing short
of national suicide.1,37 Although strong militarily,
Czechoslovakia was reluctant to take on the German war
machine without Western support.
National suicide was exactly what Hitler had in mind
for Czechoslovakia.

Henlein became Hitler's puppet--

willing to sacrifice Czechoslovakia for a German
Volksgemeinschaft [community based on a people or race].
As Seton-Watson noted:
In reality they [Sudeten Germans] are merely
an excellent tool for the aims of the dynamic
policy of the Third Reich, which wants to
extend the so-called German "living space"
into the Danubian basin and the Balkans.38
Although respected, Seton-Watson's views were not widely

proportional representation it acquired only 44 seats, one
less than the main governmental party, the Czechoslovak
Agrarians.
J.W. Bruegel, Czechoslovakia Before Munich: The
German minority problem and the British Appeasement Policy
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 12324.
This is an abbreviated English translation of a more
detailed study of Czech-German relations by J.W. Briigel,
Tschechen und Deutsche 1918-1938 (Munich: Nymphenburger,
1967).
37Ibid, 665.
38Seton-Watson, "Czechoslovakia--The Key to the Danubian
Basin," 54.
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shared by the British public or government.

If the

mistreatment of the Sudeten Germans were the main issue for
Hitler or Chamberlain then why was little said about the
German minorities in Poland, Hungary or Italy, who were
ultimately in more dire straits?

As a correspondent for

the British periodical the Spectator wrote on 12 August
1938 :
From none of these countries would it be
possible for 30,000 Germans to cross the
frontier to Breslau, parade before Herr
Hitler, shake his hand or kiss the hem of his
garment while their own leader, Konrad
Henlein, proclaims his undying love and
loyalty to that same Fiihrer.39
Without Western opposition, Hitler continued to push
Henlein to make spiraling and ultimately
demands on the Prague government.

unacceptable

During the spring and

summer of 1938, Henlein called for territorial and personal
autonomy and complete political freedom to practice Nazi
ideology for the Sudeten Germans.

Few of the British

realized that Henlein was merely a pawn of Hitler's or the
logic of Hitler's ultimate plans for Eastern Europe.

The

majority of the British governmental leaders and most of
the British press accepted the Sudeten German "question" as
a valid one.40
Contrary to what the SdP leadership told the world,
39"The Czechs and Lord Runciman," Spectator (12 August
1938): 255.
40"Hitler's
1938): 361.
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the plight of the Sudeten Germans was not that severe,
particularly in comparison to the German minorities in
Poland or Hungary.

As a reflection of Czechoslovak

democracy they enjoyed more rights, more civil liberties,
and greater political influence than any other minority in
Europe.41

The British government's continued response to

the "Sudeten problem" was to advise Czechoslovakia "to
treat the German minority with more consideration than
heretofore."42 Chamberlain had already decided that
Czechoslovakia was not worth the risk of another world war,
as he wrote to his sister on 20 March 1938:
You only have to look at the map, to see that
nothing that France or we could do, could
possibly save Czechoslovakia from being
overrun by the Germans if they wanted to do
it... Therefore, we would not help
Czechoslovakia, she would simply be a pretext
for going to war with Germany.43
Henlein and Hitler grasped Chamberlain's indifference
toward Czechoslovakia and used it to their advantage.

The

ultimate goal of Henlein and the SdP was not to gain more
rights from the Czechoslovak government but to surrender
independence and submit to German control.44 On 2 8 March
41Seton-Watson,
Basin," 54.

"Czechoslovakia--Key

to

the

42Eisenlohr to the German Foreign Ministry,
1938, DGFP, Series D, Vol II, 98.
43John Toland, Adolf Hitler (New York:
1954), 462-63.

Danubian

12 January

Ballantine Books,

44Hubert Ripka, "Czechoslovakia--The Key to the Danubian
Basin," 57.
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1938, Hitler told Henlein to raise demands unacceptable to
the Czechoslovak government so that Prague would be unable
to comply.45

In a speech to the SdP Congress at Karlsbad

on 24 April 1938, Henlein demanded "a special German state
with complete self-government and freedom to profess Nazi
ideology.1,46
A major problem for Prague in submitting to the
Sudeten German demands was that the SdP wanted political
autonomy, and the Czechs and Sudeten Germans were too
intertwined geographically to be easily separated. In
addition to the Sudeten Lands, Germans lived in other areas
of Czechoslovakia, including Prague and enclaves in
Ruthenia and Slovakia.

There were about 400,000 Czechs

living in predominately German areas and 750,000 Germans
living in predominantly Czech areas.47 Autonomy for the
Germans in a single geographic unit was simply not
feasible.

Henlein understood this, as did the journalist

and close friend of Benes, Hubert Ripka, who wrote:
The revision of Czechoslovak foreign policy
demanded by Henlein amounts in practice to a
wish that Czechoslovakia should give up her
treaties of alliance...[and] accept a place
in the 'German sphere' (LebensraunO ,48

4SRibbentrop to Eisenlohr, 29 March 1938, DGFP, Series D,
Vol II, 204.
46Memorandum, 24 April 1938, DGFP, Series D, Vol II, 242.
47Seton-Watson, "The Germans in Czechoslovakia," 657.
48Ripka, "Czechoslovakia--Key to Danubian Basin," 55.
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Seton-Watson noted that Czechoslovakia was "not a
'Corridor' for Russia to reach Germany, but a corridor for
Germany to reach the coveted Ukraine, without crossing
Polish territory. 1,49 He argued that Germany, not Soviet
Russia, was the country the West should fear.

If Germany

gained control of Czechoslovakia it would have an open path
to Ukrainian oil.

Ultimately, Hitler's interest in

Czechoslovakia was not over concern for the plight of the
Sudeten Germans but for the industrial strength of their
country.
British leaders failed to appreciate Czechoslovakia's
industrial worth, geographic importance, strategic
location, or Hitler's broader intentions.

Chamberlain

claimed on 18 March 1938 that Hitler's intent was simply
"to include all Germans in the Reich but not to include
other nationalities."50 Thus, just as Hitler considered
Henlein a pawn to gain Lebensraum for the German people,
Chamberlain used Czechoslovakia as a pawn to appease
Hitler.

Chamberlain continued to encourage President Benes

and the Prague government to do everything in their power
to come to terms with the SdP.

In June 1938, a British

correspondent in Prague wrote:
Under pressure, not only from Germany but
49Seton-Watson, "Czechoslovakia in its European Setting,"
120.

50Telford Taylor,
Munich:
The Price of Peace (Garden
City, NY: Doubleday. and Company, Inc., 1979 ), 626.
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also from the West, to avoid any measures
which might be represented as provocative,
the Czech authorities have virtually given
the Henlein Party a free hand.
The Hitler
salute has become an every-day greeting,
though the Nazi Party and its practices have
been officially forbidden since 1933.51
Because it held no treaty with Czechoslovakia, Britain
had only its integrity at stake if that country were
attacked.

France's treaty with Czechoslovakia did not

commit Britain to aid Czechoslovakia but Britain was
compelled to come to the defense of France if it were
attacked; therefore, Britain pressured Paris "to put it to
sleep" or bury it [the Czechoslovak-French Treaty].52

In

short, Chamberlain felt obligated to "the establishment and
the maintenance of peace and the removal...of all causes of
possible conflict in the amelioration of grievances between
one country and another."53 The British military situation
was another important reason for Chamberlain's commitment
to appeasement.

Britain had demobilized and disarmed after

the First World War and was ill prepared militarily for
another military confrontation with Germany.

This lack of

preparation was due largely to the fact that Chamberlain
assumed that another world war would look nothing like the
first.

He projected the air force and the navy as the most

51"Czechs and Germans," New Statesman and Nation (4 June
1938): 941.
52London Embassy to Germany Foreign Ministry, 6 May 1938,
DGFP, Vol. II, 258.
53Chamberlain, In Search of Peace, 149.
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important factors and dismissed the regular army as
obsolete.

In October 1936, he declared:

I cannot believe that the next war, if it
ever comes, will be like the last one,...and
I believe our resources will be more
profitably employed in the air, and on the
sea, than in building up great armies...We
should aim at an Army of 4 divisions plus 1
mobile division ....Territorials should be
kept for A.A. [antiaircraft] defence.54
On 26 June 1938,

Chamberlain wrote to parliament,

"[War]

we could not do, unless we had a reasonable prospect of
being able to beat her [Germany] to her knees in a
reasonable time and of that I see no sign. 1,55
Hitler had been preparing for war since his seizure of
power in 1933.

After the First World War the German army

was reduced to 100,000 officers and men who served a
twelve-year term of enlistment.

Under Hans von Seeckt,

chief of the German Army command, the Wehrmacht was turned
into a school to train enlisted men and encourage the
officers to formulate new tactical doctrines, study foreign
military strategies, and produce studies on the uses of new
weapons.

Seeckt was adept at sidestepping the limitations

imposed upon the army by the Versailles treaty and the
Allied Control Commission.

By 1933, when Hitler seized

power, he had a strong foundation on which to build his

54Taylor, Munich:

The Price of Peace. 593.

55Toland, Adolf Hitler. 463.
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Having reconstructed German military might, Hitler
cunningly used the West's own policy of self-determination
to justify Sudeten Germans demands on Prague.

Chamberlain,

continued to attempt to negotiate with Hitler by treating
him as he would a British politician in the Parliament. In
a speech on 25 February 1938, Churchill described
Chamberlain's new policy as follows:
The new policy is, perhaps, to come to terms
with the totalitarian powers in hope that by
great and far-reaching acts of submission,
not merely in sentiment and pride, but in
material matters, peace may be preserved. I
earnestly hope that Ministers will take
occasion to deny that suggestion and will
explain their policy more fully.57
Due to his miscalculation Chamberlain believed that Hitler
was a rational human being who would listen to the voice of
reason.

Even after Germany had remilitarized the

Rhineland, pulled out of the League of Nations, occupied
Austria, and was drooling over Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain
still stubbornly thought that Hitler wanted to solve
problems peacefully.

He ignored the fact that Germany was

heavily armed and was preparing for another war and clung
to his mistaken policy of appeasement.58

56Eubank, The Origins of World War II. 5-30.
57"Good Week for Dictators," 151.
58Taylor, The Origins of the Second World Wa r , 96,97.

CHAPTER 4
PRELUDE TO MUNICH

British public opinion was not unanimously behind
Chamberlain and the supporters of appeasement.

Dissenting

voices were raised beginning in March 1938 following the
Anschluss as the following excerpts from the Times (London)
demonstrate:
With the absorption of Austria, Germany is in
so commanding a position, politically and
economically, that she can envisage selfsufficiency in Europe— self-sufficiency based
on the grain and raw materials of Eastern
Europe....39
and:
Mr. Chamberlain must have pressing reasons
for his course of parleying with the
dictators, but says there is as much chance
of building a safe and settled peace with
these ravening wolves as the shepherd of a
tempting flock of sheep would have under the
circumstances.60
Blinded by his own determination to make a mistaken
policy successful, Chamberlain also displayed an ignorance
of Czechoslovakia in his choice of representatives to

59"Defections
1938): 13.
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60"Canadian Criticism
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mediate the conflict between the Czechoslovak government
and the Sudeten Germans.

On 3 August 19 38, he dispatched

Lord Runciman, a wealthy businessman, who lacked knowledge
of East Central Europe in general and the Sudeten Germans
in particular, to negotiate an accord between the SdP and
the Czech government.

On 27 July 1938, Halifax told the

Parliament that Runciman's mission was "to inform public
opinion...but, more important, to act as mediator and bring
the two sides together."6I After a month of contentious
meetings between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechoslovak
government, on 13 September 1938 Runciman came to the
conclusion that the best solution to the Sudeten German
dilemma was cession of the major Sudeten enclaves to
Germany.62 Opponents of appeasement rejected Runciman's
conclusions, but Chamberlain and his supporter continually
ignored these objections.

They tried endlessly to silence

the dissenting voices and even the London Times
correspondent in Berlin who tried to tell "the truth about
the Nazis and the futility of appeasement" was dismissed.63
The Times correspondent was not the only voice

61Lord Halifax as quoted by George Glasgow, "Foreign
Affairs: Czechoslovakia as Victim," Contemporary Review, (12
September 1938): 489.
62Chamberlain, In Search of Peace. 164.
63Paul Emrys-Evans to Harold Nicolson, 18 August 1938,
58262, P.V. Emrys-Evans Papers, British Library, Department
of Manuscripts, London, England, 54, (Hereafter PVEE).

reporting Hitler's true intentions.

Nigel Law, who once

held a position in the British Diplomatic Service, wrote:
"...a month ago Hitler explained to his Army Chiefs that
his 'political intuition’ told him that neither France nor
Great Britain (since Parliament was not sitting) would move
if he got into Czecho Slovakia quickly. 1,64 The antiappeasers persevered in their battle for an audience in the
House of Commons but were continually ignored and dismissed
as war mongers by Chamberlain's majority.

Colonel

Wedgwood, an anti-appeaser, pleaded with Parliament on 26
July 1938 to face the reality of Britain's pathetic
military preparedness:

"...we have secured peace, but ...a

peace which can only be maintained ultimately by a war into
which we shall go shackled and handcuffed."65 Wedgwood,
like most of the anti-appeasers, did not favor war but
wanted to be prepared if it transpired.
Desperate to maintain peace Chamberlain listened to
Runciman.
1938,

The Prime Minister told Hitler in the spring of

"I cannot believe that you will take responsibility

of starting a world war which may end civilization for the
sake of a few days delay in settling this long standing

64Nigel Law to P.V. Emrys Evans, PVEE 582 62, 5 September
1938, 55.
65Colonel Wedgwood, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series,
vol. 338.
House of Commons official Report, Monday 4 July
1938 to Friday 29 July 1938, 2994.
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problem. 1,66 On 14 September 1938, Chamberlain sent a
message to Hitler requesting a meeting to discuss the
Sudeten Germans, and on 15 September 1938 he traveled to
Berchtesgaden.67 Chamberlain told Hitler that he was
"ready to put to the Czech Government your proposal as to
the areas [Sudeten Lands], so that they may examine the
suggested provisional boundary."68 Chamberlain left this
meeting convinced that Hitler was willing to fight; Hitler,
on the contrary, was convinced that Chamberlain was not.
The proposals made during the meeting were delivered to
Prague on 19 September 1938 and demanded an immediate reply
from Benes.
The most difficult aspect of the deliberations for
Benes was the knowledge that he was waging an illusory
fight.69 The real issue was not the ills of the Sudeten
Germans but the unwillingness of the British and French to
go to war for the sake of Czechoslovakia.

The Czech leader

originally rejected the proposals which meant the
destruction of Czechoslovakia but realized that without
Allied support the Czechoslovak military could not
66Jiri Dolejal and Jan Kren, eds.,
Czechoslovakia's
Fight:____ Documents on the Resistance Movement of the
Czechoslovak People, 1938-1945.
(Prague:
Nakladtelstvi
Ceskoslovenski Akademie Ved, 1964), 17.
67Chamberlain, In Search of Peace, 166.
68Ibid.
69H . W. H.,
1938): 431.
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withstand a German Blitzkrieg for long.
Acutely aware of the dangers of having a weak
military, when he took the office of President of
Czechoslovakia in 1937, Benes'

"first principal reform was

to establish a Supreme Council for the Defence of the
State."

Thereafter,

"the Officers' Corps of the army was

strengthened and fully equipped [and] in the late summer of
1938 our army,...[was] one of the best in Europe."70
Benes, unlike Chamberlain, was not blinded by Hitler's
rhetoric and had taken concerted measures to prepare
Czechoslovakia for war.

Since England decided to

discontinue its campaign for a balance of power on the
continent and France gave up its policy of collective
security, Benes's efforts were insufficient when
Czechoslovakia was left to defend itself against the German
war machine.

"Czechoslovakia stood, as it were, for a

cause in which Europe and humanity at large were no longer
interested."71 With Britain and France threatening to
withhold military support, Benes was forced on 21 September
1938 to accept the proposals.
Hitler and Chamberlain met again in Bad Godesberg,
Germany on 22 September 1938.

Britain agreed to the

peaceful transfer of lands to the Germans; any show of

70Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes. 28, 29.
71Shiela Grant Duff,
"The Czechs and the
Contemporary Review. (January-June 1938): 670.
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force by the Germans would be just cause for the Czechs to
resist.

Hitler initially consented to withdraw the German

troops from the disputed areas. In a letter to Chamberlain
on 23 September 1938 he renounced his earlier agreement:
I am, however, not prepared to allow a
territory which must be considered as
belonging to Germany, on the ground of the
will of the people and of the recognition
granted even by the Czechs, to be left
without the protection of the Reich. There
is here no international power or agreement
which would have the right to take precedence
over German right.72
Hitler went on to argue that the Sudeten Germans would be
virtually defenseless without German protection and set a
deadline of 1 October 1938 for the British to accept German
terms--promising that if this were granted it would be the
last of the German demands and peace would be guaranteed.
Hitler turned the tables on Chamberlain when they met
in Bad Godesberg, claiming that if the Czechs did not
withdraw their forces from the border lands, the West would
be responsible if

war erupted.

Chamberlain wilted under

Hitler's Godesberg ultimatum and claimed that peace was no
longer in his hands but in the hands of the Czech
government.73 Back in Britain, on 2 3 September 19 38 in a
national broadcast,

Chamberlain said:

However much we may sympathize with a small
nation confronted by a big and powerful
neighbor, we cannot in all circumstances
72Chamberlain, In Search of Peace. 169.
73Ibid, 172.
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undertake to involve the whole British Empire
in war simply on her account.... If we have to
fight it will be on larger issues than
that.74
London and Paris concluded that the only way to
avoid another world war was to support Sudeten German
demands for self-determination.

This would also allow

France to disregard its treaty with Czechoslovakia.

The

British and French governments pressured Czechoslovakia to
comply with the demand for immediate transfer of all areas
having a population of more than fifty percent Sudeten
Germans.

The decision was made without the consultation of

the British or the French parliaments or the Czechoslovak
government.75 The Prague government was
informed that if we did not accept their
[Britain and France] plan for the cession of
the so-called Sudeten regions, they would
leave us to our fate, which, they said, we
had brought upon ourselves. They explained
that they certainly would not go to war with
Germany just 'to keep the Sudeten Germans in
Czechoslovakia. 176
The British government pledged to defend the corollary
Czechoslovak boundaries and promised aid if future German
aggression should occur.

Bereft of Western allies,

Czechoslovakia had no choice but to succumb to the German

74Ibid, 175.
75"Dismemberment of Destruction," Spectator (23 September
1938): 465.
76Benes, Memoirs of Dr. Edvard Benes, 43.
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demands.77 A journalist in the British Spectator wrote:
So Herr von Ribbentrop was right....[H e ]
assured Herr Hitler that Great Britain did
not mean business.
The British Government
had been ceaselessly insisting that it
did...it is tragic that the discovery that
they [Britain and France] could not help
Czechoslovakia was only made when they had
led the Czechs (and
all the world) to believe
they could...nothing could be more grossly
and palpably unfair.78
Churchill and Eden also immediately condemned the act but
remained optimistic that a united stand against German
aggression might yet succeed.77 On 28 September 1938 Jan
Masaryk, the Czechoslovak ambassador to Britain, told
Halifax and Chamberlain,

"If you have sacrificed mynation

to preserve the peace of

the world, I will be the first to

applaud you, but if no, gentlemen, God help your souls."80
After receiving news of Benes' acceptance of German
demands, Hitler sent a memorandum to Chamberlain on 28
September 1938 calling a meeting to finalize the
concessions.

The next day Adolf Hitler, Edouard Daladier,

Benito Mussolini, and Neville Chamberlain, representing
Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain, met in Munich to
determine the fate of the Sudeten Germans and of

77Chamberlain, In Search of Peace, 189.
78"What Hitler's Victory Means," Spectator (23 September
1938), 468.
79"Dismemberment or Destruction," 465.
80Charles Loch Mowat, Britain Between the Wars 1918-1940
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 617.
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Czechoslovakia.

Neither Czechoslovakia nor its eastern

ally, the Soviet Union, was present.

The Four Powers

concluded an agreement which called for the Czechoslovak
government to remove its troops from the specified areas by
1 October 1938 without destroying any existing
installations.

Occupation of the predominately Sudeten

German areas by Reich German troops would begin the same
day.

Following the occupation, a plebiscite would be held

in the annexed lands no later than November to decide on a
new government.

Finally, the Prague government was to

release, within four weeks, both unwilling Sudeten Germans
from the Czechoslovak military and any Sudeten Germans
being held for political offenses.81

On 30 September

1938, Hitler and Chamberlain signed an Anglo-German
Declaration which stated:

"We [Hitler and Chamberlain]

regard the agreement signed last night...as symbolic of the
desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one
another again."82 On the morning of 30 September 1938, the
Four Powers presented Czechoslovakia with a fait accompli
which the Prague government had no choice but to accept.
Benes was unable to consult the Czechoslovak parliament or
get any insight into public opinion because the Allies

81Walter Consuelo Langsam, Historic Documents of World
War II
(Princeton:
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1958),
10- 1 2 .

82The Anglo-German Declaration, DGFP, 30 September 1938,
1017 .
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demanded his answer within two hours.83 As Benes noted:
Without our [Czechoslovak] participation and
in spite of the mobilization of our whole
Army, the Munich Agreement--fatal for Europe
and the whole world--was concluded and
signed. . .and then was forced upon us.84
Initially Chamberlain believed that his appeasement
policy had successfully prevented another war.

On 30

September 1938, he told the British people that he had
achieved both "peace with honor" and "peace for our
time."85 Chamberlain's opponents were not deceived by
Hitler's promises and were disgusted at the grandiose
display put on by Chamberlain upon his return from Germany.
Arthur Vivian-Neal, who opposed appeasement, described his
view of Chamberlain's return:
At this distance from Downing Street the
cheering and the flowers seem utterly
repulsive, and it seems that we have only
been able to buy peace...at the price of the
disgrace of France and our dishonour.
Does
the man [Chamberlain] still suppose that he
can match with European dictators?86
Obviously he did, for in his speech in the House of Commons
on 3 October 1938, Chamberlain claimed a diplomatic victory
at the Munich conference, declaring that the ultimatum
issued by Hitler at the Godesberg conference was

83Wenzel Jaksch to Gillies, NBKR 4/164, 25 February 1939.
84Benes, Memoirs of Dr. Edvard Benes, 43.
85Chamberlain, In Search of Peace. 200.
86Arthur Vivian-Neal to P.V. Emrys-Evans, PVEE 58262, 2
October 1938, 60.
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substantially modified in the Munich Agreement.87
Moreover, Chamberlain believed that Czechoslovakia now had
a greater degree of security than ever before.

The

majority of the British public supported the policy, and
every newspaper in the country praised the Munich agreement
excluding the Reynolds' News.88

"A consensus supporting

appeasement emerged in the weeklies in the course of 1935,
and it remained virtually intact until September 1938 .1,89
Instead of formulating a thorough foreign policy,
Chamberlain chose to follow the consensus, ignoring a vital
segment of the government simply because their opinions
differed from his own.
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CHAPTER 5
AFTERMATH OF MUNICH

Chamberlain's opponents in the British Parliament were
flabbergasted at the Munich settlement.

One group of anti-

appeasers, led by Duff Cooper, were appalled at the
willingness of Chamberlain to sacrifice a country whose
military capabilities were so superior.

Cooper, when

informed of the agreement, resigned his post as Head of the
Admiralty and called the Munich Agreement a "miserable
scrap of paper..." and added that although he may have
ruined his political career by resigning, he could "still
walk about the world with my head erect."90 Furthermore,
Cooper added that agreeing to "the destruction of the only
defensible frontier of Czecho-Slovakia, we [Britain]
guaranteed that frontier." He added that it made no sense
that Britain "had guaranteed the maintenance of what we had
just destroyed."91 Cooper and others also believed that if
the Czechs had fought, Russia might very well have
supported them.

Most of the anti-appeasers, who in any

90Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget, (London: Richard Clay and
Company Ltd., 1953): 247-48.
91Ibid: 248.
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case, lacked Cooper's military expertise, simply realized
Britain suffered a terrible humiliation at the hands of
Hitler, and assumed the humiliation would not end as long
as the policy continued.

All the opponents of the

appeasement policy believed that war was imminent and
Britain would not be able to rearm quickly enough because
of Chamberlain's deluded dream of peace.92 On 16 September
1938 Eden wrote:

"I fear that in the end it may boil down

to one more surrender which we shall be asked to call
'peace'."93

In a speech to the House of Commons on 4

October 1938, Lord Lloyd, an M.P. and opponent of
appeasement, said:
There can be no peace in the heart of any
reflecting man in England when he thinks of
what was done to the Czech people last week.
Is there nothing worth fighting for?
Justice? We have scarcely heard a word about
justice in this House.94
When an opponent of appeasement asked Chamberlain whether
any British military adviser had been present at the
conference and whether anyone was consulted before handing
over the Czech fortifications and munitions unimpaired to

92Paul Emrys-Evans to Lord Salisbury, PVEE 58247, 21 July
1943.
93Anthony Eden
September 1938.
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Evans,
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94Lord Lloyd's speech in House of Commons, PVEE 58247, 4
October 19 38.
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Germany, the answer was no.95 Chamberlain was obsessed
with maintaining peace.

Thus, no one who questioned his

appeasement policy was given a platform, no matter how
reasonable the criticism.
Peace, however, was not what Hitler wanted.

He had

pushed Chamberlain at every turn and had been so successful
that he was not about to stop at the borderlands of
Czechoslovakia.

With the Munich Agreement he received more

land than he demanded in the Godesberg Ultimatum and he saw
no reason to stop there.

Chamberlain and Daladier

"...could never have realized what they were giving Herr
Hitler...the whole of Czechoslovakia... lies henceforth
directly or indirectly in the economic grip of Germany."96
In the ensuing partition of Czechoslovakia, 50 percent
of the country's industry went to Germany, and 90 percent
of its fuel resources went to Germany or Poland.

Germany

received about 40 percent of the machine and engineering
industries and 25 percent of metallurgical and machinemaking, chemicals, leather, timber, foodstuffs,
construction, small-scale engineering, and clothing
industries.

Germany also gained 180,000,000 pounds of

fortifications, armaments, factories and buildings, roads,

95Mr. Benn to Prime Minister,Parliamentary Debates. Fifth
Series, vol. 339, 28 September 1938 to 3 October 1938, 312.
96"Germany's Czech Colony," New Statesman and Nation (15
October 1938):
558.

and railways.97 Rump Czechoslovakia, left with little
industrially, was reduced to an agrarian economy.

Of

strategic importance was the fact that the one country that
had cut Germany off from Southeastern Europe no longer
formed that barrier: "The lynch-pin of the mechanism was
always Czechoslovakia.

Once that went, Hungary and Poland

became fiefs of Berlin.1'98 German rule was immediately
implemented in the occupied areas and the policy of "No
German can be subordinated to a Czech.
always the master"99 was enforced.

The German is

Even the criteria for

qualifying as a German were restricted.

Those Social

Democrats who spoke German rather than Czech were refused
the appellation of "German" because their ideology did not
match that of the Nazis.100 George Kennan, the American
Ambassador to Prague, tried to describe the political
situation in Czechoslovakia:

"I wonder whether it is

possible for anyone...to conceive of the chaos which the
Munich catastrophe created in political life and political
thought."101 The political and economic life of the Czechs

97Ibid, 558-59.
98Ibid, 559.
" Czechoslovakia's Fight. 16 March 1939, 21.
100MaryN. Hawes, "Prague in Peril," Contemporary Review.
(October 1938), 398.
101GeorgeF. Kennan, From Prague after Munich: Diplomatic
Papers 1938-1940. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1968), 7.
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and Slovaks was thrown into complete disarray that would
take years to sort out.
Many British remained unmoved when Hitler occupied the
Sudeten Lands in October 1938.

They believed with

Chamberlain that he had done the world a great service by
preserving the peace.

They took Hitler at his word and

apparently believed that Germany would end its demands.
Some British politicians justified the sacrifice of
independent Czechoslovakia by claiming it was a saison
Staat [ephemeral state] which should never have come into
existence in 1919.

Others realized the strategic

importance of Czechoslovakia and were alarmed.

Arthur

Salter, a Member of Parliament, pointed out on 21 October
1938 that Britain's strength in central Europe was now
endangered, for Czechoslovakia was central to the bastion
and without it a strong defense would be difficult to
develop.102
For the

foes of appeasement the sacrifice of

Czechoslovakia was futile, war was probable, and because of
Chamberlain's foolish policy, England was unprepared
militarily to face the German military.

Lt. Colonel C.E.

Stewart on 27 June 1939 wrote:
The spectacle of a British Prime Minister
'sucking up' to Dictators is neither edifying
nor encouraging....When it is evident to the
meanest intelligence that appeasement is a
I02Sir Arthur Salter, M.P., "British Policy Now II," (21
October 1938), 643.
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hopeless failure, he [Chamberlain] persists
in his fatuous efforts--a fine fellow indeed
to lead this People and Country at such a
time as this.103
On 1 October 1938, Benes was informed via his
ambassador in Berlin, Vojtech Mastny, that Marshal H.
Goering, head of the Luftwaffe, commanded Benes'
resignation as President of Czechoslovakia.104 On 5
October 1938, Benes, concluding he could better help his
people from a country not dominated by Germany, resigned
his post.105 Despite Benes' flight and the obvious
debacle, Chamberlain and his disciples as late as 9 March
1939 were notifying the British press that foreign affairs
were taking a turn for the better.106
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CHAPTER 6
LONG ROAD TO RECOGNITION

Unfortunately, World events did not take a turn for
the better--Hitler did not stop with the Sudeten lands.

On

15 March 1939 German troops rolled into rump Czechoslovakia
and 16 March a Reich law was passed making Bohemia and
Moravia a Reich protectorate and Slovakia a German puppet
state.107 On the very day that German troops entered the
protectorate, Chamberlain said:
that there are no differences, however
serious, that cannot be solved without
recourse to war, by consultation and
negotiation, as was laid down in the
declaration signed by Herr Hitler and myself
at Munich.108
Even after Chamberlain was informed of the rape of
Czechoslovakia, he and the majority of the parliament
voiced no regret but were concerned mainly with defending
the Munich policy.

It was left to Eden to emphasize the

significance of Hitler's move into Czechoslovakia to the
British parliament.

Eden also called for a cementing of

national unity, and highlighted the importance of
collective security against Germany's aggression.

He

continued by asking if there was any M.P. who still
believed that Hitler would not make any more demands or

107George F. Kennan, From Prague after Munich, 96.
108Wickham Steed,

"What of British Policy," 644-45.

47

that there would not, if left unchecked, be another victim
of Germany who was left to choose between resistance or
surrender.109 Although Chamberlain maintained a majority
in parliament, public opinion in Great Britain began to
shift.
wrote:

An journalist in the Spectator on 17 March 1939
"Nothing would create more confidence than the entry

of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden into the Cabinet."110 Even
the London Times, which had previously supported
Chamberlain and his policy, on 15 March called its lead
article "The Destruction of Czechoslovakia."111 The
appeasement policy was dead; and even Chamberlain was not
sufficiently deluded to believe it could persist.
Chamberlain pledged Britain's support to Poland, and in a
speech at a National Service rally, Eden endorsed the
change in policy:

"We cannot afford any more relaxation.

I hope to heaven we have no more optimistic speeches about
golden ages. We can all of us recognize the golden age when
we see it."112 A.H. Richards, the General Organizing
Secretary of the Anti-Nazi Council, formed to combat Nazi
propaganda and to help its victims, wrote to Churchill on
18 March 1939, "At long last it would appear the Prime
109Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of
Avon: The Reckoning, (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1965),
53-55 .
nO"The Rape and After," Spectator (17 March 1939), 433.
luWickham Steed,

"What of British Policy," 644.

112Eden, Memoirs of Anthony Eden. 56.
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Minister recognizes that you cannot shoo off dictators with
an umbrella."113
Although Chamberlain changed his opinion of Nazism and
ended his appeasement policy, it was not until September
1939 that he thoroughly perceived the need for decisive
action.

He said:

I trust I may live to see the day when
Hitlerism has been destroyed and a liberated
Europe has been reestablished.
The people of
France and Great Britain are alike determined
to put an end once and for all to the
intolerable strain of living under the
perpetual threat of Nazi aggression.114
Chamberlain had finally modified his sentiments toward
Hitler but he still staunchly defended the Munich agreement
as legitimate--for to denounce it would mean admitting his
entire policy of appeasement had failed.
Benes was determined to rescind the dictates of the
Munich agreement.

After a brief sojourn to the United

States where he served as a Professor at the University of
Chicago, he moved to London on 18 July 1939, joining
several former members of the Czechoslovak government
already there.115 Upon his arrival he was welcomed with a
party given by Eden and Churchill and attended by other
opponents of appeasement, including various politicians,
113Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. V: 19221939: The Prophet of Truth. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1977), 1048.
114"Prague-London Letter," 4/172, NBKR, 8.
115Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes, 81.
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the leader of the Labour Party, Seton-Watson, and several
journalists, all honoring him and condemning Munich.
Churchill gave the opening speech and promised "that the
peace which still has to be established will not be made
without C z e c h o s l o v a k i a 116 The battle for Benes and the
Czechoslovak government-in-exile would continue but they
were not alone in their fight--those who had condemned the
appeasement policy all along were still by their sides.
Benes' first order of business was to set up a
Czechoslovak legation.

The primary objective of the

legation was to gain political recognition from the other
Allied powers and thereby place the Czechoslovak
government-in-exile on an equal basis with other exiled
governments.

Additionally, he wanted the French and

British to repudiate all the consequences of the Munich
Agreement, to guarantee Czechoslovakia's pre-Munich
boarders, and to arrange an appropriate resolution to the
Sudeten German problem.117 On his brief visit to the
United States he was assured by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, and by
Republican and Democratic political leaders that America
would never acknowledge the violence committed against
Czechoslovakia and would cooperate with efforts at
116Ibid, 82.
11?Edward Taborsky, "Politics in Exile, 1939-1945," in
Mamatey and Luza, eds. A History of the Czechoslovak Republic
1918-1948. 324.
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resolution.118 On 19 September 1939, Benes opened political
negotiations with Halifax but was unable to surmount any
solid commitment to official recognition.

The British

government was unwilling to make any type of political
promise to Czechoslovakia for fear of future consequences.
Chamberlain's government refused to admit that their
foreign policy had been severely partial and gravely
flawed.
Immediately after Britain declared war on Germany,
Benes sent telegrams to the Prime Ministers of Poland,
France, the British Dominions, and Great Britain, informing
them that Czechoslovakia had legally existed after 15 March
1939 and had been at war with Germany since that date.
Benes added that Czechoslovakia would fight along side the
other Allied powers and began organizing the Czechoslovak
liberation army which would aid other Allied forces.

Benes

received replies from all the prime ministers, welcoming
the Czechoslovak support, except from France and Poland
which considered Czechoslovakia extinct since 15 March

118Ibid, 83. Although the United States promised to
cooperate, the U.S. was still very isolationist in 1939 and
made it clear to Britain, through the American Ambassador to
Great Britain, that the U.S. would not act militarily unless
directly threatened and certainly had no intentions of going
to war to save Czechoslovakia. Taylor, Munich: The Price of
Peace, 766-67, 848-52. For more detailed description of
Roosevelt's foreign policy see, Robert Dallek, Franklin D.
Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York,
1965) .
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1939 .119
After a brief visit to France, where Benes was
slighted by Daladier, who was still embarrassed by Munich,
the Czechoslovak leader met with fellow exiles: Stefan
Osusky, the former Czechoslovak Minister to Paris, General
Sergej Ingr, Dr. Eduard Outrata and Dr. Herbert Ripka.120
Daladier was unwilling to recognize a government he
considered extinct, so Benes was forced to deal with lesser
French officials and was only able to establish a
Czechoslovak National Committee with restricted
capabilities.

The Committee was grudgingly recognized by

France on 17 November 1939 and by the British on 20
December 1939.

Masaryk in a broadcast to Prague tried to

encourage those remaining in the protectorate that the
"Committee" or "Council" was working to regain
Czechoslovakia's pre-Munich status and boundaries.
November 1939 he wrote,

On 18

"a National Council, which has been

given full powers to represent our nation in all the Allied
countries... and will remain a devoted and humble servant of
your sacred cause."121 The National Committee, however,
did not have all the privileges of a recognized governmentin-exile and was limited in what it could accomplish.
U9Ibid: 85-88.
mo,.prague-London Letter" 4/172, NBKR, (16 October 1939):
10.

121Jan Masaryk, "Prague-London Letter," NBKR, 4/172, (18
November 1939): 16.
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France had once again failed its former ally Czechoslovakia
and politically handicapped Benes and Masaryk even more.
The legacy of Munich continued to haunt the Czechoslovak
government, even in exile.
After his brief dealings with the French, Benes
decided that his time was best spent lobbying the British
government.

Even though the British had renounced the

appeasement policy, their comprehension of the plight of a
small nation like Czechoslovakia was very limited.
words of Masaryk,

In the

"It is not easy for the large British

nation to understand what it means for a small nation to be
fighting for the preservation of its national
existence."122 Czechoslovakia was a small nation
surrounded by Germans on three sides and had been fighting
for survival since the day it was formed.

Most Britons

could not comprehend the Czechoslovaks' fate, making the
National Committee's job ever more difficult.
Although the National Committee had to temporarily
remain in Paris to successfully organize the Czechoslovak
Army, Benes returned to London.

Members of the National

Committee were comprised of Slovaks, Czechs, socialists,
communists, German Social Democrats, and several other
groups.

The communists were initially involved, ceased to

cooperate with the committee when the German-Soviet treaty
was signed on 23 August 1939, and then rejoined when
l22Ibid, 2.
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Germany invaded the Soviet Union.

The Sudeten German

Social Democrats, led by Wenzel Jaksch, also withdrew their
cooperation when Benes began to pursue the expulsion of the
Sudeten Germans when the war ended.123
Although the majority of the Committee was in Paris,
Benes and Masaryk began negotiations with the British
government in London.

Rumors of a German invasion of

France were circulating and Benes believed that the
Committee would have to be permanently moved to London.

On

26 April 1940, Benes opened talks through a meeting with
Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State
in the British Foreign Office.

Benes asked for approval of

a Czechoslovak Government in London made up of participants
of the National Committee and additions which would make it
representative of all the official dealings of the
Czechoslovak people.

Deliberations with the British

Foreign Office continued through July with extensive
correspondence and recognition promised in June.124
The primary issue for Benes and the Committee became
rescuing the Czechoslovak army from France so it could
continue to fight with the allies for the remainder of the

123Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes: 92-94.
On removing
the "German threat" in post-1945 Czechoslovakia, see John 0.
and Sylvia Crane, Czechoslovakia, 247-56 and Radomir Luza,
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Relations,
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(New York:
New
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124Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes. 102.
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war.

Benes wrote to Eden, who had become head of the

Dominions office and was then appointed Secretary of State
for War under Churchill's government on 12 May 1940.125 He
informed Eden that British military support was crucial in
evacuating Czechoslovak troops from France to Britain.
Eden agreed and promised to help in the rescue and after
overcoming several obstacles, Czechoslovak troops arrived
in Britain on 14 July 19 4 0 .126 Upon their arrival, Eden
sent them a message welcoming them to Britain and promising
the defeat of their common enemy, Germany.127
With the Czechoslovak forces on British soil, the
urgency for recognition of a government became
essential.

even more

Benes sent a letter to Halifax on 9 July 1940

asking for recognition of a Provisional Czechoslovak
Government with a complete state organization.

The

government would consist of: Dr. Edvard Benes, President,
Dr. Jan Sramek, Prime Minister, and twelve others.

The

government would also include a Czechoslovak State Council
which would consist of representatives of various political
Czechoslovak groups and would act as a kind of
parliament.128 In response, Halifax agreed to recognize
the Provisional government but emphasized that the British
125Eden, Memoirs of Anthony Eden. 73-74, 112.
126Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes. 103-05.
127Ibid, 105.
128Ibid, 106-07.
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government did "not intend to engage themselves in advance
to the recognition or future support in the fixing of
whatever future boundaries in Central Europe."129
Essentially, the British government, which still consisted
of several members of Chamberlain's devotees, were still
unwilling to recognize the pre-Munich boarders of
Czechoslovakia.

Churchill was in a bind because in war

time he needed undivided cooperation from the Parliament
and a total denunciation of Chamberlain's foreign policy
could have caused internal squabbling which could be
disastrous at a time when unity was crucial.130 As a
compromise, therefore, the provisional government was not
invited to become one of the Allied governments.

The

procrastination by the British especially irritated
Masaryk, the foreign minister, who signed when writing to
his friends in the British government,

"Provisionally

yours" and "asked whether the Czechoslovak airmen who were
killed flying over Britain were provisionally dead."131
"Provisional" was all the British government would concede
the Czechoslovak government for fear of having to defend
its pre-Munich borders after the war.

Provisional status

was not enough to satisfy Benes, but he realized its

129Ibid, 109-10.
130Ibid, 203.
131Z.A.B.
Zeman,
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Czechoslovakia, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1976), 183.
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importance in securing the ultimate goal of full
recognition and continued his quest.
The British government did not admit that Munich was
the reason it refused to give total recognition to Benes'
government but used other excuses instead.

The most

pronounced demand the British government put on the
provisional government was to ascertain complete solidarity
of all political Czechoslovak groups.

This proved to be an

enormous task for Benes because of the puppet government in
Slovakia which the British gave recognition preceding the
war and the submissive Emil Hacha government in the
protectorate also the recipient of British recognition.

A

further concern of the British were the exiled Sudeten
Germans with leaders like Jaksch, and the communists who
objected to being under Benes' jurisdiction.132 Jaksch and
other Sudeten Germans objected to Benes plans for expelling
"disloyal" Sudeten Germans after the war.

The Czechoslovak

communists blamed Benes for collaborating with other
"capitalist governments" at Munich since they believed
Czechoslovakia should have fought in September 19 38 .133 A
resolution sent to Benes on 15 December 1940 by the

132Taborsky, "Politics in Exile, 1939-1945," 327.
133Paul E. Zinner, Communist Strategy and Tactics in
Czechoslovakia. 1918-1948 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1963), 57-58, 79. After the German attack on the Soviet Union
relations between the communists and Benes improved rapidly
and five communists were appointed to the State Council
(parliament-in-exile).
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Executive Committee of the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia said, they deemed Benes to be in the
"service of British imperialism."

It continued in saying

that they considered the
resurrection of the old coalition in the form
of a Czech emigre 'Government' is a complete
disclosure of his [Benes] plans to re
establish the capitalistic rule of the Czech
bourgeoisie and at the same time a new
manifestation of the total decrepitude of the
political representatives of the Czech
bourgeoisie.334
To many communists, Benes, not Chamberlain was the villain
of the Munich Agreement and they adamantly refused to
cooperate in a government with him.

Recognition of Benes

as their President would mean the resignation of the Hacha
government in Prague and could provoke the Nazis into
inflicting dreadful repercussions upon those peoples still
living in those areas.

Even Hacha was unwilling to face

the possible German retribution so refused Benes' request,
putting Benes in a very difficult position with the British
government since he had assured them that he possessed
complete cooperation with the Hacha government.135
Moreover, some of the emigrants who blamed Benes for the
fate of their country intentionally tried to undermine the

134Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes, 160-61. In a memo on
23 June 1941, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union
the Czechoslovak communist attitude was completely reversed.
135Josef Kalvoda,
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Strategy. (Washington D.C.: University Press of America,
1978), 121.

58

efforts of the provisional government.
Only after several near catastrophes, and only after
the British government realized its demands for complete
unity of all political factions, was recognition promised
to Benes' provisional government.

Furthermore, differences

of status between the Czechoslovak Provisional Government
and that of other exiled nations caused so many
uncertainties and problems that the British Foreign Office
agreed to put an end to the chaos.

The process promised to

be a smooth one, as well, because Eden had succeeded
Halifax as Foreign Minister on 23 December 1940 and he was
in favor of full recognition for Benes' government.136
On 10 April 1941, Masaryk and Benes met with Eden and
tried to stress the importance of full recognition.

It

could not only right a dreadful wrong but also reassure the
other smaller countries in Eastern Europe of Britain's
faithfulness.
On 18 April, 1941, Benes handed Eden a memorandum
comprising of five requests:

"Full diplomatic recognition

de jure for the Czechoslovak government," thus legalizing
the government.

The designation of a British Minister

Plenipotentiary to the Czechoslovak Government (previously
Bruce Lockhart acted as a 'delegate').
Allied governments.

Equality with other

Use of official titles such as,

"Czechoslovak Republic" and the "President of the
136Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes. 120-24.

Czechoslovak Republic." Finally, the end of the provisional
character of the government and the resumption of the
Czechoslovak Constitution after the war.137 On 19 April
1941 Benes' luck changed and Churchill visited the
Czechoslovak troops and Benes was able to seize the
occasion to hand him a summary of the requests given to
Eden.

Churchill was taken by the vision of the exiled

troops and was further moved when the troops sang "Rule
Britannia" upon his departure.

"I thought it rather

moving--all those poor exiles, the tiny remnant of an army
...so pleased to be visited and eager in their welcome."138
Churchill gave the letter to Eden and wrote,

"I do not

understand why the Czechs could not have the same status as
the other allies. They deserve it."139 Eden agreed and
gave it to the Foreign Office for additional action. The
granting of these requests would put an end to the Munich
Agreement, making it obsolete, and guaranteeing
Czechoslovakia its pre-Munich borders after the war.

On 24

June 1941, Benes sent a message to Hacha asking him to
resign and assuring him that the
time for such a change has come...You at home
can hardly save anything, while it can only
help us here and for the future this will
mean the salvation of the unity of the nation
137Ibid, 124-25.
138Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Finest Hour, 1939-1941,
1066.

139Taborsky, "Politics in Exile,

1939-1945," 328.

60

at the worst moment in history.140
Benes needed the official resignation of the Hacha
government so he could consolidate control in London.
After a month of negotiations and debates, Eden and
the British government complied with all the demands except
the legal continuity of Czechoslovakia, meaning that the
pre-Munich borders were not guaranteed.

With Chamberlain's

legend continuing to curse Czechoslovakia, the British
government refused to "recognize or to support any future
frontiers whatsoever in Central Europe."141 Excluding the
guarantee of the pre-Munich borders, British recognition
was granted on 18 July 1941.

The Soviet Union

simultaneously recognized the Benes government and on 31
July 1941 the United States followed suit.142
But Benes' fight was not over, for although the
Czechoslovak government-in-exile was now equal with the
other exiled Allied governments, the British still did not
guarantee the pre-Munich boundaries of Czechoslovakia.

The

continued existence of several defenders of appeasement in
the Churchill government made the process very long and
exhausting for him but he was tenacious and unwilling to
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accept an agreement he considered a Diktat.

His fight for

legal continuity of the First Republic was based on two
principles:

The Czechoslovak government under intense

pressure to sign the agreement made it legally invalid
according to the Czechoslovak Constitution.

Furthermore,

on 15 March 1939, with the German invasion the agreement
was automatically destroyed.

Gaining British recognition

of these two points was not an easy task and negotiations
between Benes and Nichols dragged on, preying Benes'
patience.

On 9 April 1942 he told Nichols that the Munich

Agreement stood between their two countries and must be
resolved.

He added,

I am afraid that you Englishmen with your
lack of political imagination and foresight
do not realize what could be the consequences
of your attitude in postwar Central-European
and overall European continental politics.143
Benes' threats did not stop there, on 4 June 1942, he told
Eden that it was time to eradicate Munich for the
deliberations were "prolonging themselves indefinitely and
they are beginning to have a bad influence on our mutual
relations."144 Characteristically, Eden agreed, promised
to take over the issue himself, and in July 1942 made Benes
143Taborsky, "Politics in Exile," 331-32.
144Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes. 204.
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a proposal.
The proposition disavowed the Munich Agreement from 15
March 1938, the date it was violated by the Germans.

The

British government, also refused recognition to anything
concerning Czechoslovakia in the agreement nor any
alterations in the Czechoslovak frontiers since 1938.
Furthermore, the British government further assured Benes
that it would not be influenced in future negotiations by
the events of 1938.

Benes had finally obtained British

recognition of his countries’ pre-Munich frontiers but
still did not secure the legal continuity of his country.
Benes and his government, however, decided to drop the
issue of legal continuity, and told Eden that they would
accept the terms of the agreement with a few minor
alterations.

The final draft was presented by Eden to the

Parliament on 5 August 1942, ending any further
negotiations between the British and Czechoslovak
governments concerning the Munich Agreement.145

145Ibid, 206-08.
The issue of legal continuity of the
First Republic and "invalidity ab initio" of the Munich
Treaty continues between Czechoslovakia and Germany.
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CONCLUSION

Edvard Benes devoted his life from 1918 to 1948 to
shaping and enriching Czechoslovakia with democratic
principles and trying to guarantee the survival of the
principles he and several others worked so hard to
establish.

Collective security, a concept Benes believed

decisive in avoiding another world war, proved to be a very
demanding task. Czechoslovakia's five neighbors, Germany,
Austria, Hungary, Rumania, and Poland, were all hostile.
The Little Entente, including Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
and Rumania, was one of Benes' undertakings but proved
ineffective.

His diplomatic relations with the West and

with the Soviet Union remained strong throughout the
interwar period.

The alliance system Benes established

seemed foolproof but failed miserably because his allies
first abandoned him and his country and then helped in its
dismemberment.
On 15 March 1939, Benes thought he was vindicated, for
it was obvious to most of the world that appeasing Hitler
was futile.

Benes realized all along that the decision

made at Munich was only the beginning of Hitler's quest for
Lebensraum and that Czechoslovakia was not the last victim
of his campaign.

He believed that:
63
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The whole policy which led to Munich was
brought to the height of absurdity, was
demonstrated to be wholly impracticable and
fundamentally wrong while all those who
(whether they believed in it or not)
initiated and sponsored it were shown to be
altogether credulous, entirely frivolous and
manifestly ridiculous.146
Recognition of mistakes and especially one so huge as the
policy of appeasement with its culmination at Munich was
not an easy thing to admit, so even after it was obvious to
most of the world that Chamberlain had made a grave
miscalculation, the British leader and his disciples were
unwilling to admit the complete failure of theirpolicy.
What Benes thought would be an immediate reversal of the
Munich Agreement turned into a much longer and more
wearisome task.

All the politicians who formulated the

Munich Agreement were still in power when the war began,
making it difficult for Benes to correct the repercussions
of the Diktat.147
The appeasement policy caused the political, social,
and economic desolation of Benes' once stable country.
146Ibid, 197.
147The
expulsion
of
the
Sudeten
Germans
from
Czechoslovakia after the war remains an unresolved issue for
the Czech government.
For more information see: Radomir
Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: A Study in German
Relations. 1933-1962 (New York: New York University Press,
1964. Alfred de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam: The Expulsion of
the Germans From the East, 3rd ed. , revised (University of
Nebraska Press, 1988), is one of the few English-language
publications sympathetic to the Sudeten German expellees.
Pertinent Document Collections include Fritz Peter Habel,
Dokumente zur Sudetenfrage, 2nd ed. (Munich: Langen Muller,
1984) .
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Czechoslovakia's natural barriers were circumvented,
leaving an unobstructed passage for Hitler's forces to
march into the once defensible country and terrorize its
peoples.

Chamberlain's policy of appeasement was shallow,

irrational, and inflexible.

Eden, Churchill, Cooper, and

other opponents of the appeasement policy were experienced
politicians, well versed in foreign policy and military
strategies.

They were constantly ignored and stifled by

Chamberlain and his followers.

Appeasement developed into

a policy with only one goal-avoiding war at any cost-even
if it meant sacrificing a blameless country.

For

Chamberlain, Czechoslovakia was only a "far away country of
which I know nothing"--a country that could be sacrificed
to avoid another world war.
Had Chamberlain succeeded and Hitler not gone on to
attack Poland in September 1939, Chamberlain might today be
hailed as a great hero and diplomat.

By sacrificing

Czechoslovak independence to Germany as a form of
restitution for the injustices of the Versailles Treaty in
1938, Chamberlain would have prevented another world war.
Appeasement would be hailed as a great strategy when
dealing with dictators.

Unfortunately, the Sudeten lands

and Czechoslovakia proved to be another, and in fact
extremely critical, step in Hitler's march toward world
war.

Those who opposed Chamberlain's appeasement policy

were correct in their characterization of Hitler and his
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intentions.

Chamberlain's great gamble in isolating

himself from his opposition and making a deal with a
dictator, proved to be a disastrous mistake not only for
the Czechs but also for the entire western world.

In the

words of Benes, "In the whole of history of world diplomacy
there are few errors so fatal, so far-reaching in their
consequences for all the world as this one!"148

l48Edvard Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes: 86.
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